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INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 1983, Texas voters cast their ballots in favor of a new
amendment to article XVI, section 51 of the Texas Constitution.' The im1. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 51. This section provides:

[Tihe homestead in a city, town or village, shall consist of lot or lots amounting to not
more than one acre of land, together with any improvements on the land; provided, that
the same shall be used for the purposes of a home, or as a place to exercise the calling or
business of the homestead claimant. . ..
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mediate effect of this vote was to change the urban homestead exemption
from a value limitation of $10,0002 to an area limitation of one acre. In
addition to this anticipated result, the new amendment may give rise to
problems not anticipated by the Texas Legislature or the Texas voters. In
lay terms the word "homestead" generally refers to one's residence or
home place.4 In a legal sense, however, the term also relates to a type of
exemption5 which, for the purposes of this comment, is one that protects a
debtor's homestead from forced sale by creditors. 6
7
In Texas, the homestead exemption provided for in the Constitution
and by statute' refers specifically to the land upon which one's residence
stands.9 Once it is established that a particular lot is-exempt, the improvements thereon will also be exempt.'° Historically, Texas had placed a dollar limitation upon the value of the land that a homesteader could declare

Id; see also Tex. H.R.J. Res, 105, 68th Leg., 1983 TEX. GEN. LAWS 6724 (complete wording
of proposed amendment). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Tex. H.R.J. Res.

105, 68th Leg. (March 30,1983) (tape available at St. Mary's Law Journal Office, San
Antonio, Texas). The amendment was sponsored by Representative Charles Evans in the
House of Representatives and Senator Kent Caperton in the Senate. See id.
2. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1983). This section provides:
"[T]he homestead in a city, town or village, shall consist of lot, or lots, not to exceed in value
...
Id.
Ten Thousand Dollars.
3. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
4. See, e.g., Cullers v. James, 66 Tex. 494, 498, 1 S.W. 314, 315 (1886) (house is implied
in word homestead); Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 413, 417 (1857) (homestead includes idea of
home); Anderson v. Bundick, 245 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (homestead is land occupied by family as home).
5. Compare Wallingford v. Bowen, 104 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1937, no writ) (homestead is where family lives) with Brannon v. Bohannon, 96 S.W.2d
1036, 1037 (Ky. 1936) (homestead is right to exempt property from forced sale).
6. Cf TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13 (Vernon 1982) (allows for dollar exemption from
taxation of homestead). The homestead exemption from forced sale as discussed in this
comment should not be confused with the homestead exemption for tax purposes. See id
7. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51. This section provides: "[T]he homestead in a city,
town or village, shall consist of lot, or lots....'" Id (emphasis added).
8. See Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 41.001 (to be codified as TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985)).
9. See Cullers v. James, 66 Tex. 494, 498, 1 S.W. 314, 315 (1886) (exemption refers to
land); Kelly v. Nowlin, 227 S.W. 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ)
(claimant not restricted to rooms occupied since homestead entails lot upon which building
stands).
10. See, e.g., In re Bobbitt, 3 Bankr. 373, 373-74 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1976) (bankrupt
entitled to exemption for land up to constitutional limit plus value of all improvements);
Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 351, 282 S.W. 558, 561 (1926) (homesteader
entitled to proceeds for value of all improvements on land); Inge v. Cain, 65 Tex. 75, 78
(1885) (under 1869 Constitution, homestead consists of lots not exceeding $5000, not including improvements); see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (urban homestead consists of not
more than one acre and improvements therein).
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as exempt." Under this method, a homesteader often found himself with
property valued in excess of the limitation,' 2 with the result that a creditor
could have the homestead sold for satisfaction of his claim.13 Although
the value limitation was amended from time to time,' 4 the figure never
stayed abreast of inflation or reflected a realistic market price for urban
lots. 5 Rather than continuing to amend the value periodically, the legislature decided to change to an area limitation. 16
Since Texas has always had an acreage exemption for rural homesteads, 17 many of the laws developed for rural homestead designation will
likely become applicable to the urban homestead. The implementation of
the new law, however, will not be as simple as applying rural homestead
principles to the urban homestead. Difficulties will likely arise largely due
to the retroactivity of the amendment. The new acreage exemption applies
to all urban homesteads in Texas and not simply to the homesteads desig-

11. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1970) ($10,000); TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 51 (1876) ($5000); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845) ($2000).
12. See, e.g., Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139, 139 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (homestead
at time of designation $8000 in excess), aff'd, 532 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976); Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 349, 282 S.W. 558, 559 (1926) (homestead when designated was $1,470 in excess of $5,000 limitation); Hoffman v. Love, 494
S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas) (homestead purchased for $12,250 when exemption limit was $5,000), writ re'dn.r.e per curiam,499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
13. See Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 351, 282 S.W. 558, 561 (1926)
(proper means of reaching excess is sale of homestead); Paschal v. Cushman, 26 Tex. 74, 75
(1861) (decree subjecting homestead to sale was appropriate); see also Bush & Proctor,
Piercingthe Homestead- The Trialof an Excess Value Case, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 387, 391-92
(1982) (discussion of how creditors can reach excess above homestead exemption amounts).
14. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1970) (increasing value to $10,000);
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876) (increasing limit to $5000); TEX. CONST.art. VII, § 22
(1845) (increasing exemption to $2000); Law of Jan. 26, 1839, Act of the Republic of Texas,
2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 125-26 (1898) (establishing first Texas exemption of $500).

See generally TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955) (discussing
history of homestead exemption).
15. See HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg. (March 30,
1983) (tape available at St. Mary's Law Journal Office, San Antonio, Texas). Professor Joseph McKnight, in testifying on behalf of the adoption of the amendment before the Judiciary Committee, indicated that the value limitation was originally to have provided
protection for a residence and a place of business. Today, he explained, the value is "grossly
inadequate in most communities to cover even the land value of the home." Id
16. See Debate on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105 on the Floor of the House, 68th Leg. (April 14,
1983) (second reading and adoption) (tape available at St. Mary's Law Journal Office). Representative Evans explained that the purpose of the amendment was essentially to eliminate
the ability of creditors to force a sale of urban homesteads in Texas as was being done under
the $10,000 limitation. See id
17. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 1. The applicable language provides: "The homestead, not in a town or city, shall consist of not more than two hundred acres of land. . .
(emphasis added) Id
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nated after the enactment of the amendment.I8 Consequently, the retroactivity of the amendment creates questions concerning the rights of
creditors and debtors who might deem it more advantageous to rely on the
former exemption law.
The objective of this comment is first to explore the policy considerations behind the existence of a homestead exemption, for only by understanding the purposes of such a law and its effects upon society may it be
determined whether Texas' new homestead exemption will achieve desirable results. Second, this comment will attempt to predict some of the
problems that may arise in implementing the change in the law. Particular
attention will be paid to the new law's retroactivity which the legislature
has expressly established for the first time in the history of the exemption
limitation. 9
II.

BACKGROUND ON HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS

A. Historical Considerations
Homestead rights are rooted in statutes and did not exist in early common law.2 ° There were provisions in English law enabling a debtor to
maintain his clothing and tools of trade, but otherwise the debtor reaped
little sympathy.2 ' The Spanish civil law, on the other hand, had exemptions for the homes of the favored classes but only under rare circumstances.22 The homestead exemption is consequently an American
18. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51;see also Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg., 1983 TEX.
6724. Section 2 of this law provides: "This amendment applies to all homesteads in this state, including homesteads acquired before the adoption of this amendment."
Id
19. See, e.g., Linch v. Broad, 70 Tex. 92, 96, 6 S.W. 751, 755 (1888) (no retroactive
treatment of 1876 exemption); McLane v. Paschal, 62 Tex. 102, 106 (1884) (1866 provision
not retroactive); Paschal v. Cushman, 26 Tex. 74, 75 (1861) (new $2,000 exemption not
retroactive).
20. See, e.g., Weller v. City of Phoenix, 4 P.2d 665, 666 (Ariz. 1931) (homesteads are
creatures of statutory law, not common law); Kleinert v. Lefkowitz, 259 N.W. 871, 873
(Mich. 1935) (at common law, creditor could not sell debtor's land); Wyatt v. Bauer, 332
S.W.2d 301, 304 (Mo. App. 1960) (homestead right not from common law); see also S.
THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTION LAWS 3 (1878) (right of homestead is statutory).
21. See, e.g., Glenn, Property Exempt From Creditors'Rights of Realization, 26 VA. L.
REV. 127, 128 (1939) (only enough clothing to protect debtor exempt); Rombauer, Debtors'
Exemption Statutes - Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REV. 484, 485 (1961) (clothing, tools, and
animals exempt at common law); Wall, Homesteadandthe Process ofHistory.- The Proposed
Changes in Article X,Section 4, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 878, 885 (1977) (necessary wearing
apparel was exempt).
22. See McKnight, Protection of the Family Home From Seizure by Creditors. The
Sources and Evolution of a Legal Principle, 86 Sw. HIST. QUART. 369, 373 (1983) (homes of
nobility and gentry protected except for debts to crown); Wall, Homesteadand the Process of
GEN. LAWS
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innovation, fostered by the philosophy and circumstances that existed during the early history of this country.23 The principle reason behind its enactment in the states was to provide for the debtor and, more importantly,
for his family, an asylum from creditors in the wake of the financial turmoil of the 1830's.24 It was simultaneously perceived that the enactment of
such a law might attract settlors to newer and less developed territories.25
Not surprisingly, the Rebublic of Texas was the first region to enact a
homestead exemption law in 1839.26 In the early Texas case of Franklin v.
Coffee, 27 Chief Justice Hemphill wrote:
That the homestead exemption was founded upon principles of the
soundest policy cannot be questioned. Its design was not only to protect citizens and their families, from the miseries and dangers of destitution, but also to cherish and support in the bosoms of individuals,
those feelings of sublime independence which are so essential to the
maintenance of free institutions.2"
Thus, the notion of insuring to an individual his own piece of land also
harmonized with the anti-feudalistic attitude that motivated the development of this country.29
History.- The ProposedChanges in Article X, Section 4, 6 FLA.
(houses of knights and noblemen exempt from execution).

ST.

U.L.

REV.

887, 888 (1977)

23. See 1018-3rd Street v. State, 331 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959,
no writ) (homestead law direct result of Panic of 1837); see also C. WRIGHT, ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

252-53 (2d ed. 1949) (discussion of the financial troubles

in 1830's and subsequent National Homestead Act Legislation); Comment, State Homestead
Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024 (1937) (discussion of historical conditions giving
rise to exemption law).
24. See 1018-3rd Street v. State, 331 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959,
no writ). This case offers an excellent discussion of the policy reasons behind enactment of
the homestead exemption in Texas and lists the following purposes: (1) to maintain the
unity of the family and encourage homesteading; (2) to provide the family as well as the
debtor with a home and a means of support; (3) to establish in the individual a sense of
freedom and independence. See id.at 453.
25. See 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
YEAR 1919: THE AUSTIN PAPERS 996-97 (E. Barker ed. 1924) (letter written by Stephen
Austin advocating enactment of exemption law in Texas to encourage colonization); Comment, State Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1025 (1937) (immigration of
debtors to Texas to escape creditors).
26. See Law of Jan. 26, 1839, Laws of the Republic of Texas, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 125-26 (1898); see alsoTEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955)
(history of Texas homestead exemption).
27. 18 Tex. 413 (1857).
28. Id at 416.

29. See S.

THOMPSON,

A

TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS

2 (1878).

The author stated:
The late Senator Benton, advocating in the United States Senate the adoption of a
general homestead policy, said: "Tenantry is unfavorable to freedom. It lays the foun-
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Contemporary Considerations
1. General Reasons for Exemptions

In addition to the historic considerations, there have been other suggested policy reasons for enacting a homestead exemption. First, such exemptions ease the burden of debtors on the rest of society by lessening the
need for welfare payments if the debtor is rendered homeless. 30 Exemptions also help to rehabilitate the debtor by enabling him to retain a reasonable amount of assets to rebuild his estate and eventually pay off his
debts.3 ' Finally, homestead exemptions help to keep the family together
by providing it with a base and by relieving it of some of the psychological
pressures of indebtedness that typically lead to divorce. 32 Consequently,
forty-three states now have a homestead exemption in either constitutional33 or statutory form. 34 The only general statement that can be made
dation for separate orders in society, annihilates the love of country, and weakens the
spirit of independence. ... The freeholder, on the contrary, is the natural supporter of
a free government ... "
Id. (citing Thirty Years in the Senate 103, 104).
30. See, e.g., Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Jones, 117 A.2d 226, 227 (D.C. 1955)
(exemption law is to protect community at large); Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla.
1954) (exemption laws prevent debtors from becoming public charges); Young v. Geter, 170
So. 240, 241-42 (La. 1936) (exemptions prevent debtors from burdening society); see also W.
NUNN, A STUDY OF THE TEXAS HOMESTEAD AND OTHER EXEMPTIONS 2 (1931) (homestead

laws benefit society).
31. See Ulrich, Virginia's Exemption Statutes - The Need for Reform and a Proposed
Revision, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1980) (allowing debtor to retain property
leads to rehabilitation); ef.Burlington v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (purpose of Bankruptcy Act exemptions to give bankrupt enough property to make fresh start); Maschke v.
O'Brien, 17 A.2d 923, 924 (Pa. 1941) (purpose of Exemption Act to allow debtor enough
money to tide him over to better days).
. 32. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 873-74 (Tex. 1978) (homestead laws
protect the family); Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 595, 19 S.W.2d 35, 38
(1929) (purpose of homestead provision to protect family); Allison v. Shilling, 27 Tex. 450,
455 (1864) (object of homestead exemption is to provide family with home); Trawick v.
Harris, 8 Tex. 312, 314 (1852) (law is to protect wife and children); see also R. WAPLES, A
TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 4 (1893) (when home is taken away family unit
is endangered); Vukowich, Debtors'ExemptionRights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 784-85 (1974) (protection of homestead lessens strain on family).
33. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (urban homestead not exceeding one acre of
land nor exceeding $2500 dollars in value); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (urban homestead of
one-half acre); W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48 (homestead of $5000 exempt from forced sale).
Some of the provisions of the state constitutions are self-executing, meaning that their provisions may take effect without the necessity of implementing legislation. Compare ALA.
CONST.art. X, § 205 ("Every homestead not exceeding eighty acres") and TEX. CONST. art.
XVI, § 51 ("homestead, not in a town or city, shall consist of not more than two hundred
acres of land") with MD. CONST. art. III, § 44 ("Laws shall be passed ... to protect from
execution a reasonable amount of property of the debtor.") and NEV. CONST.art. IV, § 30
("homestead, as provided by law shall be exempt").
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about these exemptions, however, is that they vary enormously in their
particular limitations. 35 Most of the states place a value limitation on the
homestead,36 with only seven states applying a strict area limitation.37
Some of the exemption laws combine both an area and a value limitation,3" while only one state establishes a limit based upon the number of
members in a household.3 9

34. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.010 (1962) (Alaska exemptions act); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 33-1101 (1956) (homestead definition and exemption); HAWAll REV. STAT.
§ 651-92 (Supp. 1982) (real property exemption).
35. See, e.g., KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-2301 (Vernon 1982) (1 acre homestead
limitation); N.C. CONST. art. X, § 2 (homestead limitation of $1000); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-18-01 (Supp. 1983) (exemption limitation of $80,000); see also R. WAPLES, A TREATISE
ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 208-23 (1893) (discussion of different limitations upon
homestead used).
36. See ALA. CONST. art. X, § 205 ($2,000); ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.015 (1962) ($27,000);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1101 (Supp. 1983-1984) ($50,000); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 38-41201 (1973) ($20,000); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1979) ($5,000); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 651-92
(Supp. 1982) ($30,000 for head of family or person over 65 years, $20,000 for single adult);
IDAHO CODE § 55-1201 (Supp. 1983) ($25,000 for head of family, $12,000 for single adult);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-901 (Smith-Hurd 1983) ($7,500); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-1
(Bums Supp. 1983) ($7,500); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.080 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982)
($5,000); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 9 ($15,000) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422 (Supp.
1983-1984) ($7,500); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-Op. 1981) ($50,000);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6023 (Callaghan 1977) ($3,500); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.475
(Vernon Supp. 1984) ($8,000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Supp. 1982) ($6,500); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 115.010 (1981) ($75,000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:1 (Supp. 1981) ($5,000);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-10-9 (Supp. 1983) ($20,000): N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5206 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) ($10,000); N.C. CONST. art. X, § 2 ($1,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-1801 (Supp. 1983) ($80,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.73 (Baldwin 1983) ($1,000); OR.
REV. STAT. § 23.240 (1981) ($15,000 when 2 or more members of household are debtors,
otherwise $20,000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-200 (Law. Co-Op. Supp. 1983) ($10,000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301 (1980) ($5,000 for individual, $7,500 aggregate if more than
one debtor per household); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (Supp. 1973) ($30,000); VA. CODE
§ 34-4 (Supp. 1983) ($5,000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.12.050 (Supp. 1983-84) ($20,000);
W. VA. CODE § 38-901 (Supp. 1983) ($5,000); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 815.20 (West 1977)

($25,000); WYO. STAT. § 2-7-508 (1977) ($30,000).
37. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1/2 acre); IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.2 (West 1946) (1/2
acre); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-2301 (1976) (1 acre); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02
(West Supp. 1984) (1/2 acre); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-31-4 (1983) (1 acre); TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1 acre).
38. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-224 (Supp. 1983) (urban homestead not to exceed one
acre and $2500, but not to be reduced to less than one-quarter acre); Miss. CODE ANN. § 853-21 (Supp. 1983) (homestead not to exceed one hundred sixty acres nor $30,000 in value);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-32-104 (1983) (urban homestead of 1/4 acre but not to exceed
$40,000); OKLA. CONST. art. XII, § I (homestead not to exceed one acre nor $5000 in value,
but not to be reduced to less than one-quarter acre).
39. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-3 (Supp. 1983). This section provides: "(1) A
homestead consisting of property in this state shall be exempt in an amount not exceeding
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Value Limitation Exemptions

The arguments for or against a particular type of exemption vary as
widely as the exemptions themselves. Most critics of the value limitations
agree that the fixed dollar amounts have tended to be unrealistic figures in
relation to the current market prices of urban lots.4" As early as 1857
Chief Justice Hemphill foresaw the flaws in a value limitation which he
expressed in the Texas case of Wood v. Wheeler 4" when he wrote:
It is, in my view, to be regretted that any limitation, as to value, was
placed on the homestead exemption. Property, in value, is subject to
great mutation. . . It is impossible, without great injustice, to fix any
arbitrary value on a homestead, even if the price of property was altogether stationary. A house wholly unsuitable for a large family might
be comfortable and convenient for man and wife alone.42
The states relying upon a value limitation have generally been criticized
for being too slow in altering their exemptions to reflect the modern costs
of realty,4 3 although recently many of the states have responded by increasing their value limitations.' On the positive side, value limitations
provide the states more flexibility in altering the exemption to fit the needs
of the urban community.45 Use of a dollar value can also balance the
rights of creditors by not allowing too many assets to be shielded from
$8,000 in value for a head of family, $2,000 in value for a spouse, and $500 in value for each
other dependent." Id
40. See Countryman, Fora New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV.
678, 683 (1960) (obsolete value limits evident in homestead exemption statutes); Haskins,
HomesteadExemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1293 (1950) (value limit should not remain
fixed, in light of economic and social changes); Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws. Timefor
Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355, 356 (1959) (fixed dollar limitation cannot adjust itself to
and will be obsolete most of time); Karlen, Exemptionsfrom Execution, 22 Bus. LAW. 1167,
1167 (1967) (fixed dollar value amounts likely unrealistic in light of today's costs).
41. 7 Tex. 13 (1851).
42. Id. at 22-23.
43. See Unif. Exemption Act, 13 U.L.A. 365 (1980) (Prefatory Note) (state exemption
laws archaic); Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L.
REV. 678, 683 (1960) (homestead exemption values obsolete); Karlen, Exemptionsfrom Execution, 22 Bus. LAW. 1167, 1167 (1967) (homestead values unrealistic); see also Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 513.475 (Vernon 1949) ($3,000 limit had not been revised since 1929); N.C. CONST.
art. X, § 2 ($1,000 limit has never been changed); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876,
amended 1970) (1876 limit of $5,000 not increased until 1970).
44. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.080 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980) (amended
from $1,000 to $5,000 in 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-21 (Supp. 1983) (amended from
$15,000 to $30,000 in 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:1 (Supp. 1981) (amended 1981
from $2,500 to $5,000).
45. Cf. UNIF. EXEMPTION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 367 (1980) (Contents of the Act) (variable
value limitation). To prevent exemption legislation from becoming archaic due to economic
and social changes, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
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claims.4 6
3. Area Limitation Exemptions
An area limitation has been criticized as much as the fixed value limitation. Despite the overwhelmingly pro-debtor stance taken by the majority
of the states,47 the counterbalancing need for fairness to the creditor
should still be considered. 4 ' First, it is argued that the area limitation provides the debtor with unnecessary protection and an easier means with
which to defraud his creditors.49 While policy dictates that the debtor and
his family be provided with sufficient assets for subsistence, equity does
not require a creditor to subsidize an improvident debtor's lavishing of his
homestead property with unlimited improvements. 50 Second, with more
money to expend on improvements, the wealthier debtor is favored by the
area limitation." The lower income debtor, on the other hand, is
drafted a homestead exemption limited in value but subject to adjustment using a price
index. See id §§ 2, 4.
46. See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1290, 1293 (1950) (writer

advocates a variable value limitation).
47. See Garrard v. Henderson, 209 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1948, no
writ) (homestead should be upheld even if dishonesty perpetrated on creditor); see also McPherson v. Everett, 172 So. 2d 784, 786 (Ala. 1965) (homestead should be liberally construed); Rowe v. Gose, 401 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Ark. 1966) (homestead exemption should be
construed to favor debtor); In re Estate of Bowman, 609 P.2d 663, 667 (Idaho 1980) (debtor
should be favored by liberally applied exemption statute); Woods v. Alvarado State Bank,
118 Tex. 586, 600, 19 S.W.2d 35, 40 (1929) (homestead exemption should be liberally construed in favor of debtor).
48. Cf. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1983). The court in this case held that a
debtor who, prior to declaring bankruptcy, sold a large amount of non-exempt property to
pay off the mortgage on his homestead in an attempt to defraud his creditors, would be
denied discharge in bankruptcy and thereby effectively eliminated his exemption. See id at
988.
49. See Title Ins. Co. v. Agora Leases, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Minn. 1982) (court
advocates change in limitation); O'Brien v. Johnson, 148 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 1967)
(court urges value limitation); see also Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV.
the
1289, 1292 (1950) ("where there is no statutory restriction except in terms of area ...
exemption becomes a tempting vehicle for fraud"); Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws. Time
for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 356, 365 (1959) ("some dollar value limitation is necessary");
Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 802 (1974) ("Exemptions of onehalf acre and one-quarter acre of urban property, without a value limitation cannot be
defended.").
50. See Ulrich, Virginia's Exemption Statutes - The Need for Reform and a Proposed
Revision, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 130-31 (1980) (creditors should not have to subsidize
debtor's purchase of home).
51. See Cole, The HomesteadProvisionsin the Texas Constitution, 3 TEXAS L. REV. 217,
222 (1925) ("the wealthy family is to have a large allowance and the poor family a small
one"); Davis, Letting Affected Parties Communicate Standards - Exempt Property, 53 IoWA
L. REV. 366, 373 (1967) (homestead exemption is favoritism to upper and middle classes).
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financially constrained from transforming nonexempt property into part of
the exempt homestead, and he thereby receives a smaller exemption
allowance.52
The Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed its disapproval of its
state's area limitation.5 3 In O'Brien v. Johnson,54 the court found the possibilities of fraud too great under Minnesota's law. 55 While an appeal
from an unfavorable judgment was pending, the judgment debtors in this
case sold their $13,000 homestead and moved into an apartment located on
land they owned which was worth over $100,000.56 According to Minnesota law, the new $100,000 homestead, the $13,000 proceeds from the sale
of the former homestead, and the $1,600 a month income from the stores
and apartments on the new homestead property were all exempt from the
judgment.5 7 The court held that the O'Brien's had a legal right to protect
their assets in such a way, but it strongly encouraged the legislature to
enact a value limitation to prevent such injustices to creditors in the
future.58
Despite disfavor among some critics, the area limitation can better preserve the homestead which is the fundamental purpose of a homestead
exemption.5 9 The area limitation also requires little or no attention once it
52. Cf. Davis, Letting Affected Parties Communicate Standards- Exempt Property, 53
L. REV. 366, 373 (1967) (homestead is self-limiting in value due to maintenance costs).
53. See Title Ins. Co. v. Agora Leases, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Minn. 1982) (in suit
brought by judgment debtor to remove lien from homestead, court recommended legislature
impose ceiling on value of homestead); O'Brien v. Johnson, 148 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Minn.
1967) (suit by tortfeasor against judgment creditor to set aside property as homestead).
54. 148 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1967).
55. See id at 361; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (West 1945). The applicable
urban homestead provision read as follows: "If it [the homestead] be within the laid out or
platted portion of such incorporated place having 5,000 inhabitants, or over, its areas shall
not exceed one-third of an acre ...
" Id
56. See O'Brien v. Johnson, 148 N.W.2d 357, 358-60 (Minn. 1967).
57. See id at 360-61.
58. See id at 360-61. Subsequent to the O'Blrien decision the Minnesota legislature did
change the exemption limitation by increasing the acreage limit to one-half acre. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (amended 1969) (West Supp. 1984).
59. See Frase v. Branch, 362 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (purpose of
homestead law to protect home), appeal dismissed, 368 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1979); Magel v.
Hunt, 265 N.W. 119, 121 (Iowa 1936) (homestead protection superior to payment of debts);
Engstrom's of Alexandria, Inc. v. Vaughn, 138 So. 2d 672, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (policy of
homestead law to protect home); First Nat'l Bank v. Tiffany, 242 P.2d 169, 173-74 (Wash.
1952) (homestead laws favored in law). In Texas, the homestead right is of such a superior
nature to other rights that it is upheld even when creditors have been defrauded. See, e.g.,
Crosswhite v. Moore, 248 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd) (homestead upheld notwithstanding wrongdoing by debtor); Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Miller, 240
S.W.2d 405, 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1951, no writ) (business homestead exemption enforced despite fraudulent creation); Garrard v. Henderson, 209 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex.
IOWA
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has been enacted, and therefore enables the state legislatures to spend their
time on other pending matters.6 °
4. Arguments Against Homestead Exemptions
At least one writer has advocated doing away with homestead exemptions altogether because of the changed social conditions since homestead
exemptions were first enacted. 6' Today, there are alternative modes of
housing in the form of apartments which, it is argued, eliminate the need
for debtors to own a homestead.62 Other critics of the exemption point to
the deleterious effects such a law has on the growth of capital in the community by preventing the use of innovative financing by more prudent
homeowners in states where the exemption cannot be voluntarily waived.63
Although protecting the homesteader from overburdening his land is a
reasonable policy consideration, the counter-productive effect of such an
approach should be noted. For many people, the homestead is their largest or only asset.' If a financial emergency were to arise, the homesteader
might be forced, on his own, to sell the homestead to raise the needed
capital due to the inability to borrow on the equity established in his
home.6 5 This possibility is clearly not in accord with the objective of securing the family with a home place. Nevertheless, in spite of the adverse
Civ. App.-Dallas 1948, no writ) (homestead laws enforced even if they assist dishonest
debtor).
60. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (one-half acre urban homestead since 1868); see also
Maines & Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revisted: Florida'sHomestead Exemption, 30 U.
FLA. L. REV. 227, 229 (1978) (Florida has had one-half acre urban homestead exemption
since 1868).
61. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 805 (1974) (discussing
historical and contemporary policy considerations behind homestead exemptions); see also
Comment, PrinciplesforModernizing the Connecticut Debtors' Exemption, 6 CONN. L. REV.
142, 157 (1973) (in defense of Connecticut's repeal of homestead statute writer argues original justifications for exemption no longer exist).
62. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 805 (1974) (families
today can conveniently live in central units).
63. See Davis, New Moneyfor Old Homesteads, 35 TEX. B.J. 39, 39-48 (1972) (discussion of limitations on Texas homesteaders in creating capital from homestead); Ulrich, Virginia's Exemption Statutes - The Needfor Reform and a ProposedRevision, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 127, 130 (1980) (too many debtor assets free from legal seizure increase risk of
lending and retard granting of credit); Woodward, The HomesteadExemption. A Continuing
Needfor ConstitutionalRevision, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1957) (homesteads prevent
use of innovative financing).
64. See In re Bobbitt, 3 Bankr. 372, 373 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1976) (principal asset of
bankrupt was homestead).
65. See Woodward, The Homestead Exemption: A Continuing Needfor Constitutional
Revision, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1957). The author further notes that, due to the
emergency of the conditions, the homesteader would likely have to sell at a less desirable
price. See id. at 1047.
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effects, most critics advocate some form of homestead exemption. 66
III.

ELEMENTS OF TEXAS URBAN HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

A. HistoricalBackground
Provisions for a homestead exemption appear in Texas history as early
as 1829.67 The governing bodies of Coahuila and Texas enacted a decree
in that year exempting the land of colonists from foreign creditors. 68 The
act was shortly thereafter repealed but then revived in an 1839 statute enacted by the Republic of Texas. 69 The provision of 1839 exempted from
all creditors "fifty acres of land or one town lot" but placed a dollar ceiling
of $500 on improvements.7 ° This law was also repealed, 7' but the Texas
constitutional congress, recognizing the significance of such a law, reinstated a homestead exemption and drafted it into the Texas Constitution of
1845 .72 For the first time, this provision made a distinction between a rural and an urban homestead and placed a value limitation upon the latter
of $2,000. 7 ' The language of the provision was unclear, however, as to
66. See S. ENZER, R. BRIGARD, F. LAZAK, SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING

BANKRUPTCY REFORM 272 (1973). In this study, a panel of various creditors, bankruptcy
experts, judges, lawyers, and others were polled and the majority advocated the desirability
of a homestead. See id at 272.
67. See E. BARKER, THE LIFE OF STEPHEN F. AUSTIN 221-27 (1925) (discusses important role Austin played in enactment of Texas homestead provision); McKnight, Protection
of the Family Homefrom Seizure by Creditors. The Sources and Evolution of a Legal Principle, 37 Sw. HIST. QUART. 369, 369-83 (1983). Professor McKnight reveals the history behind Texas' early reputation in the United States as a debtor's haven. See id at 375.
68. See Decree No. 70 of Jan. 13, 1929, Laws and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas, I H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 220 (1898). This law provided: "ART. 1. The lands acquired by
virtue of colonization law. . . shall not be subject to the payment of debts contracted previous to the acquisition of said lands, from whatever source the said debts originate or proceed." Id.; see also McKnight, Protectionofthe Family Homefrom Seizure by Creditors.- The
Sources and Evolution ofa LegalPrinciple, 37 Sw. HIST. QUART. 369, 388 (1983) (act did not
refer specifically to foreign creditors but most debts owed by Texas colonists were to
foreigners).
69. See Act of Jan. 26, 1839, Laws of the Republic of Texas, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 125-26 (1898).
70. See id The law provided: "[T]here shall be reserved to every citizen or head of a
family in this Republic. . .fifty acres of land of one town lot, including his or her homestead, and all improvements not exceeding five hundred dollars in value .. " See id
71. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955) (fourth Congress of Republic of Texas annulled 1839 law).
72. See Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 591, 19 S.W.2d 35, 36 (1929) (first
constitutional provision in 1845); see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50, interp. commentary
(Vernon 1955) (law of 1839) (unexplainably repealed but revived in 1845 Constitution).
73. See Wilson v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 677, 678 (1869) (Constitutions of 1845 and 1866
established value of $2,000); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845). This article provided: "The
homestead of a family not to exceed two hundred acres of land, (not included in a town or
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what property was to be included in the value limitation of the urban
homestead.74 Chief Justice Hemphill, in Wood v. Wheeler,75 interpreted
the ambiguous language of the provision to mean that improvements were
to be included in the valuation.7 6
The constitution of 1869 enlarged the homestead exemption to $5,000
and clarified the Legislature's intention that only the value of the land was
to come under the exemption limitation; all improvements, regardless of
value, fixed upon exempt land would also be exempt.7 7 The constitution
of 1869 also imposed the still current exceptions to the exemption for debts
arising from the advancement of the purchase money for the land and for
taxes and improvements thereon.7 8
The homestead provisions in the constitution of 1876 were basically the
same as those in the constitution of 1869 except that all mortgages, deeds
of trust, and other liens upon the homestead that were not for the purposes
of purchase money, improvements, and taxes were made invalid.7 9 Under
the prior law, liens upon the homestead were valid, although they did not
attach until the homestead character subsided, ° but under the new provision such liens would be totally void. 81 Another unique feature of the
1876 constitution provided for the right to include a place of business as
city) or any town or city lot or lots, in value not to exceed two thousand dollars, shall not be
subject to forced sale ...." Id
74. See Inge v. Cain, 65 Tex. 75, 78 (1888) (1845 exemption not to exceed $2000 with
improvement thereon). See generally TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51, interp. commentary
(Vernon 1955) (explaining that Texas Supreme Court in 1851 construed limitation to include
improvements).
75. 7 Tex. 13 (1851).
76. See id at 25 (1851); see also Williams v. Jenkins, 25 Tex. 279, 307 (1860) (value of
lot refers to improvements thereon).
77. See Inge v. Cain, 65 Tex. 75, 78 (1885) (gives early history of changes to exemption
provision and notes change in 1869 Constitution to exclude improvements from valuation);
see also TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (1869) ("homestead . . . not to exceed five thousand
dollars in value . . . without reference to the value of any improvements . . . ").
78. See TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (1869). This article provided: "[T]he homestead

• . . shall not be subject to forced sale for debts, except they be for the purchase thereof, for
the taxes assessed thereon, or for labor and materials expended thereon ...." Id
79. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. The provision reads: "No mortgage, trust deed, or
other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid ...." Id
80. See Duke v. Reed, 64 Tex. 705, 715 (1885) (under prior law mortgage could attach
to land when homesteader died leaving no family).
81. See Inge v. Cain, 65 Tex. 75, 80 (1885) (deed of trust declared void in light of proof
of homestead character); see also McDonald v. Clark, 19 S.W. 1023, 1025 (Tex. 1892) (trust
deed upon homestead void ab initio); Hays v. Hays, 66 Tex. 606, 608, 1 S.W. 895, 897 (1886)
(deed in reality mortgage on homestead and therefore void); Woeltz v. Woeltz, 57 S.W. 905,
906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) (abandonment of business homestead did not revive void mortgage), rev'd on other grounds, 94 Tex. 148, 58 S.W. 943 (1900).
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part of the urban homestead.8 2 It is likely that the Legislature enacted
such a provision to place the urban homesteader on a more equal footing
with the rural homesteader who was generally able to protect his principle
means of support within his 200 acre rural homestead exemption.8 3 The
homestead provisions remained unaltered from their 1876 form until the
early 1970's when two additional changes were made. In 1970 the value
limitation on the urban homestead exemption was once again increased,
this time to $10,000.84 Then, in 1973 article XVI, section 50 was amended
to enable single adults to claim homestead rights.8 5 Thus, these changes in
move towards inthe Texas homestead exemption evidence a continual
86
debtor-homesteader.
the
for
creased protection
B.

The Texas Urban Exemption
1. In General

A homestead in Texas is considered an "estate,"8 7 meaning that the
homestead right must attach to some possessory interest in land.88 For the
82. See, e.g., Wright v. Straub, 64 Tex. 64, 65-66 (1885) (place of business became
homestead); Shryock v. Latimer, 57 Tex. 674, 677 (1882) (place of business as well as residence can be homestead); Miller v. Menke, 56 Tex. 539, 549 (1882) (urban homestead can be
business place); see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (homestead to be used as home or place
of business).
83. See Maines & Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida's Homestead Exemption, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 227, 259 (1978) (business homestead created more equality
between rural and urban homesteaders). This article also notes that Florida abolished its
business homestead due to the obsolescence of the idea. See id at 259.
84. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1970).
85. Compare TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876) (homestead of a family) with TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, amended 1973) (homestead of a family, or of a single adult
person). Before the amendment, the homestead exemption extended to the family, to the
single adult who was also the head of a family, or to a single adult continuing a previously
established homestead claim of a spouse or parent. See generally Note, Effects of Extending
the HomesteadExemption to Single Adults, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 658, 658 (1974) (homestead
previously limited to family or single adult acting as head of family or survivor).
86. Cf.Carson v. McFarland, 206 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947,
writ refd) (homestead exemption laws should not be restricted so as to minimize their
purpose).
87. See Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43, 52, 35 S.W.2d 673, 678 (1931) (right of homestead is an estate); Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 594, 19 S.W.2d 35, 38
(1929) (homestead is an estate); Hargadene v. Whitfield, 71 Tex. 482, 488, 9 S.W. 475, 478
(1888) (homestead right is an estate); Garrard v. Henderson, 209 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1948, no writ) (homestead is estate); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Nauert, 200 S.W.2d
661, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1942, no writ) (homestead right is an estate in land); see
also W. NUNN, A STUDY OF THE TEXAS HOMESTEAD AND OTHER EXEMPTIONS 14 (1931)
(homestead right is estate in land).
88. See, e.g., Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 64, 161 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1942) (co-tenant
can assert no greater right in homestead than other co-tenants); Gann v. Montgomery, 210
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right to arise, the claimant must manifest an intention to occupy the land
as such followed by physical acts of occupancy. 9 By definition, the urban
homestead may consist of one or more lots within the prescribed limitation.9" If there is more than one lot they need not be connected but rather
may be detached. 9' An interesting feature of the Texas urban homestead
is that it may include a residence and/or a place of business9 2 as long as
they are in close proximity to one another.9 3 If the homestead consists of
both, they are still considered as one unit, since the law provides that there
can be but one homestead. 94 By statute, 95 the homesteader may sell his

S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ refd n.r.e.) (absent possessory
interest in land, homestead right could not attach to trailer on the land); Kelly v. Nowlin,
227 S.W. 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ) (homestead right attached to
apartment building upon land).
89. See, e.g., Cheswick v. Freeman, 155 Tex. 372, 376, 287 S.W.2d 171, 173 (1956)
(claim of homestead not supported by evidence of overt acts; intent alone is insufficient);
Gilmore v. Dennison, 131 Tex. 398, 400, 115 S.W.2d 902, 902 (1938) (lack of overt act manifesting intention to occupy prevented homestead claim); Clark v. Salinas, 626 S.W.2d 118,
120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981) (preparation to occupy property constituted sufficient overt act), writ rej'd n:r.e. per curiam, 628 S.W. 2d 51 (Tex. 1982).
90. See, e.g., Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell, 142 Tex. 63, 68, 175 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1943)
(homestead may be more than one parcel); Achilles v. Willis, 81 Tex. 169, 171, 16 S.W. 746,
746 (1891) (claimant entitled to one homestead which may consist of more than one detached lot); Ragland v. Rogers, 34 Tex. 617, 619 (1870) (homestead may consist of several
lots).
91. See, e.g., Hayes v. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank, 111 S.W.2d 1172, 1175 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, writ dism'd) (separate tract used for grazing part of homestead); Engbrock v. Haidusek, 95 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, writ ref d)
(lot on different block from homestead but used for growing crops part of homestead); Panhandle Constr. Co. v. Flesher, 87 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ
dism'd) (lot across alley used as playground part of homestead).
92. See Rock Island Plow Co. v. Alten, 102 Tex. 366, 368, 116 S.W. 1144, 1145 (1909)
(homestead may consist of residence and business place); City of El Paso v. Long, 209
S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1947, writ ref d n.r.e.) (residence may exist without business place and business homestead may exist without residence).
93. See Rockett v. Williams, 78 S.W.2d 1077, 1078 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ
dism'd) (place of business in Ferris, Texas could not be part of homestead when residence
was Waxahachie, Texas); Purdy v. Grove, 35 S.W.2d 1078, 1082 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1931, writ ref d) (family residence in Dallas and business place in Highland Park constituted
one homestead).
94. See O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1976) (business and
residence constitute one homestead); Rock Island Plow Co. v. Alten, 102 Tex. 366, 367, 116
S.W. 1144, 1145 (1909) (residence and place of business are one homestead); Scarborough v.
Home Owners' Loan Corp., 161 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref d
w.o.m.) (business and residence are one unit); Rockett v. Williams, 78 SW.2d 1077, 1078
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ dism'd) (business place is part of urban homestead);
Purdy v. Grove, 35 S.W.2d 1078, 1081 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref d) (business
place is part of urban homestead).
95. See Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 41.002(b) (to be codified as TEX. PROP. CODE
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homestead and will have six months to reinvest in a new one without the
proceeds being subject to the claims of his creditors.9 6 Thus, the homestead right can continue to exist until the homesteader abandons it.9 7
2.

Determining the Value Under Prior Law

The limitation on the exemption set out by the Texas Constitution does
not enter into the definition of a homestead.98 The homestead is defined in
one section of the constitution99 and the value limitation is provided for in
a subsequent section.'l° Consequently, under the former law, when the
homestead exceeded the value limitation, it did not cease to be a homestead, but that portion in excess of the limit was non-exempt property and
unprotected from creditors.' 0 ' According to Texas case law, when a creditor recovered a judgment against the debtor, he could levy upon any nonexempt property the debtor had which included any portion of land in
excess of the constitutional value limitation.10 2 If the homestead could not
ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985)). The statute provides: "The proceeds of a
voluntary sale of a homestead are not subject to garnishment or forced sale before six
months after the date of the sale." Id.
96. See, e.g., Watkins v. Davis, 61 Tex. 414, 416 (1884) (when old homestead sold with
intention of reinvesting in new homestead, proceeds are protected); Jones v. Maroney, 619
S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) (proceeds from sale of
homestead exempt from garnishment for six months); Witt v. Teat, 167 S.W. 302, 303 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, writ refd) (proceeds from voluntary sale of homestead exempt for six months); cf. Simmons-Newsome Co. v. Malin, 196 S.W. 281, 282-83 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1917, no writ) (proceeds from voluntary sale of homestead transferred to
third person without reinvestment in new homestead, may be garnished by creditors after six
months).
97. See Fiew v. Qualtrough, 624 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (homestead character lost by abandonment); Franklin v. Woods, 598
S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (cessation of use with intent
to abandon terminates homestead); Long Bell Lumber Co. v. Miller, 240 S.W.2d 405, 406
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1951, no writ) (homestead lost by abandonment); Garrard v.
Henderson, 209 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1948, no writ) (property loses its
homestead character when abandoned).
98. See O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1976) (quantity and
value form no part of homestead definition); Hargadene v. Whitfield, 71 Tex. 482, 491, 9
S.W. 475, 479 (1888) (value limitation forms no part of definition).
99. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
100. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
101. See O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1976) (creditor may
recover from excess homestead if he proves excess); Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex.
342, 350, 282 S.W. 558, 561 (1926) (excess in homestead may be subjected to creditors'
claims); Whitemen v. Burkey, 286 S.W. 350, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1926, no writ)
(excess can be subjected to claims of creditors); Panhandle Lumber Co. v. Fairey, 3 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no writ) (excess is non-exempt property).
102. See, e.g., In re Dawkins, 11 Bankr. 213, 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (creditor's
judgment lien effective against subsequent homestead claim); Hargadene v. Whitfield, 71
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be partitioned to separate the exempt from the non-exempt portions, the
creditor could force a sale of the homestead. 103 The debtor first received
from the proceeds that portion constituting the value of the exempt land
plus the value of the improvements thereon." ° The creditor would then
be entitled0 5to the remainder of the proceeds up to the amount of his
judgment.
The constitution and statutory law provided that the value of any homestead properties was to be determined "at the time of their designation as
the homestead."" This languge was interpreted to mean that "the homestead exemption should not be reduced by inflation of land values."'0 7
Thus, under the former law, if at the time of purchase the homestead did
not exceed the dollar value limit, any subsequent appreciation in the value
of the property would remain exempt.' 08 If the property exceeded the limitation, however, this situation would entail a proration of the increase between the exempt and non-exempt property upon a forced sale of the

Tex. 482, 491, 9 S.W. 475, 479 (1888) (sale of homestead is means of appropriating excess);
Harrison v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 S.W. 209, 212 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, judgmt. adopted)
(judgment lien attached to excess homestead).
103. See, e.g., Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (court can
order sale of entire homestead), afl'd, 532 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976); Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 350, 282 S.W. 558, 561 (1926) (sale of
homestead proper means of reaching excess); Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas) (exempt property may be sold to reach excess), writ refd n.r.e. per
curiarn, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
104. See, e.g., Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 351, 282 S.W. 558, 561 (1926)
(homestead claimant receives value of improvements and homestead exemption from
proceeds first); Paschal v. Cushman, 26 Tex. 74, 75 (1861) (payment of judgment from proceeds subject to allowance for exempt portion); Wood v. Wheeler, 7 Tex. 13, 26 (1851)
(homesteader receives from proceeds value of lot first).
105. See Paschal v. Cushman, 26 Tex. 74, 75 (1861) (property should be sold for payment of judgment subject to exemption allowance). But see Whiteman v. Burkey, 115 Tex.
400, 404, 282 S.W. 788, 789 (1926) (if property does not bring more than homestead claimant's exempt share at judicial sale, no sale of that homestead can take place then or in
future).
106. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1970) (homestead not to exceed
value at time of designation); see also Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576 § 41.001(a)(2) (to be
codified as TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985)) (homestead
not to exceed value at time of designation as homestead).
107. See Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ refd
n.r.e. per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
108. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 832, 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1975) (lot purchased at or below limitation remains exempt despite appreciation over
limitation), rev'd on other grounds, 542 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1976); Hoffman v. Love, 494
S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas) (totally exempt homestead remains exempt no
matter how much value increases), writ re/d n.r.e. per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973);
Lake v. Boulware, 35 S.W. 24, 25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd) (exempt property that
increases in value remains exempt).
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homestead.' °9 The 1973 case of Hoffman v. Love" ° has served as the
guide for the technique used. In Hoffman, at a time when the exemption
limit was $5,000, a lot was purchased for $12,250, and subsequently sold
for $36,750."' In determining the amount of exemption to which the
debtor was entitled, the court found that the lot would be exempt according to the proportion $5,000 bore to $12,250.' 12 Therefore, 20/49 of the lot
was exempt and 29/49 was non-exempt so that, upon the sale of the homestead, the debtor was entitled to exempt 20/49 of the $36,750, or $15,000 of
the proceeds. 13 The Hoffman formula, however, is now meaningless and
inapplicable to the urban homestead
since value no longer forms a part of
4
the current one acre exemption.''
3. Implementation of the New Exemption
Since the legislature has not yet enacted any provisions outlining the
implementation of the new urban exemption,' 5 one can only assume that
a combination of the principles of both the urban and the rural homestead
will apply. The rural homestead may consist of 200 acres for a family or
100 acres for a single adult and may entail one or more parcels of land." 6

109. See Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139, 139 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (excess amount

"divided by value at time property was designated" multiplied by property's present value),
afl'd, 532 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Steenland v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc., 648 S.W.2d 387, 390 n.4 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ) (exemption determined by ratio between exemption limit when property was designated and value
of lot at acquisition); Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas) (lot
exempt in proportion that original limitation bore to purchase price of lot), writ re/d n.r.e.
per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
110. 494 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ re'd n.r.e. per curiam, 499 S.W.2d
295 (Tex. 1973).
111. See id at 595.
112. See id at 595.
113. See id. at 595. See generally Bush & Proctor,Piercing the Homestead- The Trial of
an Excess Value Case, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 387, 390-91 (1982) (use of Hoffman method for
determining excess value).
114. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
115. See HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg. (March 30,
1983) (tape available at St. Mary's Law Journal Office, San Antonio, Texas). In discussing
the amendment, Representative Evans mentioned that he was working on implementation
legislation, but as of the date of this comment no legislation has been published. See id
116. See, e.g., Houston & Great N.R.R. Co. v. Winter, 44 Tex. 597, 610 (1876) (rural
homestead may be 200 acres); Johnson v. Conger, 166 S.W. 405, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1914, no writ) (owner can exempt 200 of his 320 acres); Carroll v. Jeffries, 87 S.W.
1050, 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, writ ref d) (owner could exempt 200 acres out of 400 acre
tract); see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (homestead not in city consists of not more than
200 acres of land); Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 41.001(a)(l) (to be codified as TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 41.00l(a)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985)) (homestead consists of not more than
200 acres for family and 100 acres for single adults).
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The homestead claimant may voluntarily designate the tracts of land that
will compose the acreage limitation, 7 but within those designated tracts
the residence must be included.'" 8 The purpose of designating the homestead out of land in excess of the area limitation is to enable the homesteader to choose which tracts he wishes to exempt from creditors and
separate that land from the non-exempt portions." 9 To designate a homestead, the claimant must execute and have recorded a written instrument
containing "(1) a description sufficient to identify the property designated;
(2) a statement by the person who executed the instrument that the property is designated as a homestead of the person's family; (3) the name of
the original grantee of the property; and (4) the number of acres designated. .. ."120 If the claimant does not voluntarily designate his homestead area, any judgment creditor of the homesteader may request that the
homesteader designate such within eleven days or the property may be
designated as a matter of law. 2 ' The property not included in the

117. See Radford v. Lyon, 65 Tex. 471,476 (1886) (exempt portion may be designated);
Ratcliffv. Smith, 178 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1943, writ refd) (homestead
right initiated by designation); see also Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 41.022(a) (to be
codified as TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.022(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985)) This section provides: "If a family homestead that is not in a town or city is part of one or more tracts
containing a total of more than 200 acres, the head of the family may voluntarily designate
not more than 200 acres of the property as the homestead." Id. Contra Coates v. Caldwell,
71 Tex. 19, 21, 8 S.W. 922, 923 (1888) (where homestead consists of less than 200 acres no
designation needed).
118. See Hughes v. Hughes, 170 S.W. 847, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1914, no
writ) (residence must be included in designated tracts); Morris v. Pratt, 116 S.W. 646, 647
(Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ) (only limitation on designation is that residence must not be
excluded); McGaughey v. American Nat'l Bank, 92 S.W. 1003, 1007 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905,
writ refd) (homesteader cannot exclude mansion house from exemption); Cervenka v.
Dyches, 32 S.W. 316, 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, writ refd) (homesteaders cannot disclaim
residence and farm as homestead).
119. See, e.g., Affieck v. Wangermann, 93 Tex. 351,354, 55 S.W. 312, 313 (1900) (purpose is to rid excess property of constitutional inhibition of encumbering); Blake v. Fuller,
184 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1944, no writ) (purpose of designation is to
exclude excess from operation of homestead law); Smith v. Van Slyke, 139 S.W. 619, 621
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1911, writ dism'd judgmt. cor.) (purpose of designation is to fix
homestead).
120. Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 41.022(a) (to be codified as TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 41.022 (a) (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985).
121. See White v. Glenn, 138 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ
dism'd judgmt cor.) (if owner does not designate, creditor may do so); Smith v. Van Slyke,
139 S.W. 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1911, no writ) (if claimant does not set aside
excess, it could be set aside by operation of law); Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 41.023(a)
(to be codified as TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.023(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985)). This section provides:
If an execution is issued against an owner of a homestead that is eligible for voluntary
designation but that has not been designated, the officer holding the execution may, and

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:603

22
designation may thereafter be sold to satisfy the creditor's claim.'
Ultimately, the ability to designate the homestead property under the
new urban acreage limitation should provide the homesteader with more
protection due to the increased exemption and also due to the ability to
partition the excess land from the exempt portions so that the entire homestead need not be sold for creditors to reach the excess.' 2 3 There is, however, still the possibility that the homestead can be sold. If the excess
cannot be separated from the exempt portions, such as when the improvements encompass the entire tract of land owned by the homesteader, the
creditor is entitled to have the homestead sold.' 24 The court usually grants
the creditor an undivided interest to the extent of the excess, whereupon he
becomes a co-tenant with the homesteader and may then choose whether
to execute his judgment
and foreclose upon the property to recover the
25

non-exempt proceeds.'

4. Analysis of New Exemption
The decision to change the urban homestead exemption in Texas to an
acreage limitation ultimately encompasses positive as well as negative aspects. The inherent flaws of a value limitation as expressed by Chief Justice Hemphill over a century ago in Wood v. Wheeler 126 were major factors
in motivating the Texas Legislature to change the state's exemption to an
shall at the request of the plaintiff in execution .. notify the defendant that if the
defendant fails to designate a homestead before the 11th day after the date the notice is
delivered, the officer will have the designation made as provided by law.
Id.
122. See Whiteman v. Burkey, 115 Tex. 400, 403, 282 S.W. 788, 789 (1926) (court cannot protect excess above 200 acres); Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 350, 282 S.W.
558, 561 (1926) (excess over 200 acres not protected); Blake v. Fuller, 184 S.W.2d 148, 152
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1944, no writ) (91 acre excess sold to satisfy creditor's claim); Henkel v. Bohenke, 26 S.W. 645, 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ) (excess sold first to satisfy
creditor); cf.Booth v. H.P. Drought & Co., 89 S.W.2d 432, 433, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1935, writ dism'd) (owner could mortgage land in excess of 200 acres).
123. See Blake v. Fuller, 184 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1944, no writ)
(homestead rights not affected by sale of excess); Ratliff v. Smith, 178 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1943, writ ref'd) (sale of excess does not affect right in homestead).
124. See Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 350, 282 S.W. 558, 561 (1926)
(creditor could have property sold to reach excess); General Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Trabue, 174 S.W. 689, 691-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1915, no writ) (creditor may
foreclose on property and receive undivided interest therein to extent of excess).
125. See General Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Trabue, 174 S.W. 689, 691-92 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1915, no writ). In Trabue, the court held that a creditor having an
undivided interest to the extent of the excess, became a co-tenant to the extent of his interest
in the property. See id.at 692.
126. 7 Tex. 13 (1851).
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area limitation.' 2 7 The former value limitation exemption was arguably
too low for many homeowners in light of current land prices. 28 As a consequence, the debtor's homestead was more susceptible to forced sale by
creditors. 29 Furthermore, while a debtor would be entitled to receive an
exempted portion of the proceeds from a forced sale with which to invest
in a new homestead, the proceeds might be insufficient to purchase a new
home due to inflated realty prices.' 30 Consequently, the debtor could lose
his excess proceeds to creditors as well, due to an inability to reinvest.' 3 '
In order to stay abreast of inflation under the former scheme, the exemption provision would have required constant amendment. 132 The acreage
limitation, therefore, will likely eliminate the need to increase the urban
homestead exemption again in the future and will provide more protection
to the homestead.
The arguments against such a large exemption however, are persuasive
when the possibilities for fraud upon creditors are considered. 133 With the
ability to claim both a residence and a business place as a homestead
within the one acre limitation, the capacity for placing improvements

127. See Debate on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105 on the Floor of the House (second reading
and adoption), 68th Leg. (April 14, 1983) (tape available in office of St. Mary's Law Journal,
San Antonio, Texas). Representative Evans in presenting the resolution to the house, explained that its purpose was to prevent forced sale of the homestead in Texas. See id.
128. See HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg. (March 30,
1983) (discussion by Professor J. McKnight on ineffectiveness of value limitation).
129. See, e.g., Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (homestead purchased under $5,000 limitation subject to sale), aft'd, 532 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Clement v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Tex. 342, 351, 282 S.W. 558,
561 (1926) (homestead subject to sale); Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas) (homestead could be sold to reach excess), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 499
S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
130. Cf. Simmons-Newsome Co. v. Malin, 196 S.W. 281, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1917, no writ) (proceeds from voluntary sale may be garnished after six months).
131. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 793-94 (1974) (law
should enable debtor to sell homestead and reinvest in new one by providing sufficient exemption limitation).
132. Cf. Cole, The Homestead Provisions in the Texas Constitution, 3 TEXAS L. REV.
217, 217 (1925). In this article, the writer criticizes the incorporation of the homestead exemption in the Texas Constitution, arguing that a Constitution is not the appropriate instrument of law to be used in setting forth a provision which requires constant change to keep
up with social developments. See id. at 217.
133. See O'Brien v. Johnson, 148 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Minn. 1967) (owners sold homestead to reinvest in new home worth ten times as much to avoid creditor's claim); Bush v.
Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935, no writ) (owner swindled
creditor out of money which he used on improvements to homestead); see also Resnick,
Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Non-Exempt Assets to Purchase or
Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 628 (1978)
(open-ended exemptions unjustifiably keep assets from creditors).
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thereon is enormous.' 34 The potential for such a result clearly makes the
state's exemption overbroad in light of the previously mentioned policy
objectives of maintaining a homestead exemption. Furthermore, it is questionable whether urban homeowners in Texas had actually expressed a
great demand or need for an increased exemption, despite the amendment's enactment by popular vote. 135 The one acre limitation may increase protection for imprudent debtors, but it also increases the
restrictions on raising capital for the more prudent homesteader. 3 6 Perhaps justice would have been better served for both the debtor and the
creditor by increasing the value once again and providing a means of automatically increasing the limit over time to keep up with inflation.' 37 The
value exemption could have also included improvements in its limitation,
thereby reducing the potential for fraud upon creditors. 38 Alternatively, a
limitation scheme employing a more rational relation to the debtors
financial circumstances, such as the method used in Utah, could have been
39
adopted.'
Irrespective of all of the features that were not incorporated into the
Texas urban homestead exemption, there is one unique provision in the
new amendment that has yet to be considered. The retroactivity of the

134. See Steenland v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc., 648 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) ($25,000 homestead improved to $800,000); cf. Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions. A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800? 53 CORNELL L. REV.
663, 664-65 (1968). In this article, the author tells of a story from the New York Times
about a Texas couple who induced creditors to loan them over two million dollars. Upon
bankruptcy, the Medders were able to exempt their homestead with a house worth $250,000
and a barn worth $175,000 thereon. See id at 665 (citing N.Y. Times, May 25, 1967 at 41,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, May 26, 1967, at 25, col. 1;N.Y. Times, May 27, 1967, at 28, col. 2.).
135. See HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg. (March 30,
1983) (tape available in Law Journal Office of St. Mary's University Law School, San
Antonio, Texas). When asked whether there had been a "ground swell" of activity in forcibly selling homesteads, Professor McKnight answered that there was not a great deal of
effort to do so, but that there was some. See id
136. See Davis, New Moneyfor Old Homesteads, 35 TEX. B.J. 39, 40 (1972) (difficulty
of refinancing the homestead); Woodward, The Homestead Exemption: A Continuing Need
for ConstitutionalRevision, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1957) (homestead provision prevents use of innovative financing).
137. See UNIF. EXEMPrION ACT §§ 2,4, 13 U.L.A. 365-379 (1980). Section 2 of the Act
provides for dollar increases according to the Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners
and clerical workers. Section 4 provides for a value limitation on the homestead exemption.
See id at 374, 377.
138. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1981) (homestead of
$50,000 in land and buildings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-101 (Supp. 1982) (homestead consisting of house, appurtenances, and land, not exceeding $6,500); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01
(Supp. 1983) (homestead, consisting of land, house, all improvements not to exceed $80,000).
139. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-3 (Supp. 1983) ($8,000 for head of family, $2,000
for spouse, $500 each for other dependents).
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new exemption also requires analysis as to its fairness to both debtors and
creditors in Texas.
IV.

RETROACTIVITY OF THE NEW AMENDMENT

A. Relroactivity in General
Historically, retroactive legislation has been looked upon with suspicion."4 The common view has been that people form expectations about
the law's application and pattern their behavior accordingly, so that when
the legislature enacts retroactive changes these expectations are disturbed. 4 ' The legislative act "violates what is often called the rule of law,
namely, an entitlement of persons to guide their behavior by impartial
rules that are publicly fixed in advance."' 42 Why, then, would the Texas
Legislature propose an amendment to the constitution which will have retroactive effect? Two considerations will perhaps shed light on this question. First, the common view has recently been criticized for its
generalization that all retroactive laws are unjust. 143 Second, even within
the context of the common view there have been noted exceptions to the
rule.'" For example, when a law is enacted "to bring legal rights and
relationships into conformity with what people thought they were and intended them to be," retroactive application is justified. 4 Another often
cited exception is that retroactive laws are valid as long as the vested rights
of individuals are not impaired. 146 These considerations, therefore, will be
140. See, e.g., Combs v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 749, 754 (D. Vt. 1951) (retroactive
laws not favored); State v. Martin, 130 P.2d 48, 51 (Ariz. 1942) (retrospective laws not favored); Goldston v. Karukas, 23 A.2d 691, 694 (Md. 1942) (law does not favor retroactivity);
see also 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.02 (4th ed.
1973) (retroactive application of laws potentially unfair); Smith, RetroactiveLaws and Vested
Rights, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 231, 234 (1927) (retrospective laws are under suspicion).
141. See Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 425, 426

(1982).
142. Id at 427.
143. See id at 427, n.6. Munzer's article proposes a different approach to analyzing
retroactive legislation, by considering whether the expectations disrupted were "rational and
legitimate." See id at 432.
144. See, e.g., Cochran v. City of Thomasville, 146 S.E. 462, 466 (Ga. 1928) (retroactive

act authorizing bonds for street improvement not unconstitutional); Van Derzee v. City of
Long Beach, 39 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (App. Div. 1943) (retroactive law affecting a remedy not
unconstitutional); Daniel v. Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 127 Tex. 213, 220, 93 S.W.2d 372, 375
(1936) (retroactive law requiring commissioners to fix title insurance rates held not
unconstitutional).
145. See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.05 (4th
ed. 1973) (analysis of criteria for determining valid retroactive legislation)..
146. See, e.g., Vail v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 1-15 P.2d 389, 393 (Col.
1941) (prohibition of retroactive law applies only to impairment of vested right); McCord v.
Smith, 43 So. 2d 704, 708-09 (Fla. 1949) (retrospective law only invalid if disturbs vested
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explored in determining whether application of Texas' new urban homestead exemption will have unfair effects upon creditors and debtors.
B. Early Texas View of Retroactivity
The retroactivity of the 1983 amendment to article XVI, section 51 of
the Texas Constitution 147 raises several questions regarding its effect on
the rights of creditors and pre-established homesteaders. Early Texas
cases indicated that the previous value limitation amendments were not
applied retroactively. 148 The general consensus of opinion at that time was
that to apply the law in such a way would result in an unconstitutional
impairment of contractual obligations. 149 This view originated in the
United States Supreme Court 5 ° which had held that state homestead exemption amendments applied retrospectively were in derogation of article
1, section 10 of the United States Constitution.' 5 ' In the 1872 case of Gunn
v. Barry,152 the Court addressed Georgia's redraft of its constitution en-

right); Haas v. Haas, 162 So. 5, 6 (La. 1935) (retrospective laws do not violate constitution
unless vested right is divested); see also Grigsby v. Peak, 57 Tex. 142, 146 (1882) (laws may

be applied retrospectively when vested right not disturbed).
147. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1983). The retroactive provision
of the bill proposing a change to the urban homestead exemption was sponsored by Representative Terral Smith. The provision was introduced as an amendment to H.R.J. Res. 105
just before the House of Representatives voted to adopt the joint resolution and the retroactive application amendment. See Debate on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105 on the Floor of the House,
68th Leg. (April 14, 1983) (second reading and adoption) (tape available from House Committee Representative, P.O. Box 2910, Austin, Texas, 78769 and St. Mary's University Law
School, Law Journal Office, San Antonio, Texas).
148. See Linch v. Broad, 70 Tex. 92, 96, 6 S.W. 751, 755 (1888) (disallowing retroactivity of 1876 exemption); Wright v. Straub, 64 Tex. 64, 66 (1885) (disallowing retroactivity of
1876 provision making place of business an urban homestead); McLane v. Paschal, 62 Tex.
102, 106-07 (1884) (provision in 1866 exemption making value exclusive of improvements
not retroactive); Paschal v. Cushman, 26 Tex. 74, 75 (1861) (new exemption of $2,000 not
applied retroactively).
149. See Wright v. Straub, 64 Tex. 64, 66 (1885) (constitutional convention did not
intend to interfere with previously existing rights in enacting exemption); McLane v. Paschal, 62 Tex. 102, 106 (1884) (retroactive application would impair contractual obligations).
150. See Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 598, 601 (1877) (holding unconstitutional
the retroactive application of North Carolina constitutional provision increasing homestead
exemption); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610, 623-24 (1872) (holding invalid Georgia
constitutional provision increasing homestead exemption retroactivity); see also S. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS § 12 at 16-19 (1878) (declaring
exemption laws unconstitutional).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This article provides: "No state shall ... pass any
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ..
.
Id.
152. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872).
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larging the homestead exemption.1 53 The Georgia courts had allowed the
new law to apply retroactively, effectively exempting land that would have
been subjected to pre-existing money judgments. 54 The United States
Supreme Court found the Georgia provision, inasmuch as the law was to
apply retroactively, an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. 5 5 The Court declared:
The effect of the act in question, under the circumstances of this judgment, does not indeed merely impair, it annihilates the remedy. . . It
withdraws the land from the lien of the judgment, and thus destroys a
vested right of property which the creditor had acquired in the pursuit
of the remedy to which he was entitled by the law as it stood when the
judgment was recovered. It is in effect taking one
person's property
56
and giving it to another without compensation.
Reliance of the Texas courts on Gunn was reinforced by the provision in
the Texas Constitution that prohibits retroactive application of any
laws.' 57 Despite its stringent wording, however, the Texas courts have interpreted the prohibition as only encompassing retroactive laws that disturb an individual's vested rights.' 5 8 The most difficult task, therefore, in
analyzing the effects of a retroactive law is determining whether a vested

153. See id. at 621. The previous Georgia law exempted from execution 50 acres of
land and improvements thereon not to exceed $200. The new constitutional provision exempted the homestead realty up to $2,000. See id at 622.
154. See id at 621-22. The homesteader's land was worth $1,300 but far exceeded the
50 acre exemption limitation under the earlier law. The effect of the new constitution, applied retroactively, exempted the entire 272 acre homestead from the creditor's judgment.
See id.at 621-22.
155. See id at 622-24.
156. Id at 622-23. The Court, in stating that the constitutional provision impaired the
obligation of a contract found that "[t]he legal remedies for the enforcement of a contract
. . . are a part of its obligation." Id at 623; see also Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 607
(1877) ("The remedy ... is part of its obligation."). But see Smith, Retroactive Laws and
Vested Rights, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 231, 241 n.70 (1927) (citing cases supporting proposition
that no one has vested right to remedy).
157. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16. The article provides that: "No bill of attainder, ex
post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be
made." Id.
158. See, e.g., McGinley v. McGinley, 295 S.W.2d 913, 914, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1956, no writ) (no vested rights involved in retroactive application of statute reducing required number of years of separation before divorce); Purser v. Pool, 145 S.W.2d
942, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1940, no writ) (statute barring recovery of real estate
sales commission if dealer not licensed cannot be applied retroactively since vested contract
right involved); City of Fort Worth v. Morrow, 284 S.W. 275, 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1926, writ refd) (retroactivity of statutory right to appeal from order granting new
trial disallowed); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16, interp. commentary (Vernon 1955) (explaining court interpretation of retroactive prohibition).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST MARY'S LAW JO URNWAL

[Vol. 15:603

right is affected.' 5 9
C. Retroactivity and Its Effects on Creditors
1. Texas Law
In Texas, when a creditor is awarded a judgment by the court he must
comply with the statutory requirements of recording and indexing the
60
judgment before a lien will attach to the debtor's non-exempt property.
Case law has held that the effect of abstracting the judgment is to bestow
upon the creditor a vested right to a lien upon the debtor's non-exempt
realty 16 1 which cannot be divested by a change in the exemption laws 6 2 or
a subsequent homestead designation by the debtor. 163 Consequently, a
creditor who has already recovered a lien upon what was excess value in
159. See, e.g., Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745, 760 (1871) (no vested right in limitation laws of state); DuPre v. DuPre, 271 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, no
writ) (father did not have vested right in continuing child support payments under previous
law after retroactive statute increased minority age to eighteen); McCutcheon v. Smith, 194
S.W. 831, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas) (purchasers of realty did not have vested right in
previous statute of limitation), aftd, 242 S.W. 454 (Tex. 1922); see also T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 438 (6th ed. 1890) (explains vested right). Cooley wrote:
[A] right cannot be considered a vested right, unless it is something more than such a
mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general law: it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal
exemption from a demand made by another.
Id at 438. But see Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 231, 231
(1927) (defining a "vested right" is impossible).
160. See, e.g., Askey v. Power, 36 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding
approved) (no judgment lien attaches until abstract recorded and indexed); TPEA No. 5
Credit Union v. Solis, 605 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ) (recording
and indexing judgment creates lien on non-exempt property); R.B. Spencer & Co. v. Green,
203 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1947, no writ) (in order for abstract of judgment to create lien, statutory requirements must be followed); see also Act of May 24, 1983,
ch. 576, § 52.001 (to be codified as TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon Supp. 19841985)) (when judgment is recorded and indexed it operates as lien upon all real property of
defendant). See generally Hudspeth, Judgment Liens andAbstractsofJudgment in Texas, 32
TEX. B.J. 520, 520 (1969) (creation of judgment lien depends on compliance with statutes).
161. See Gage v. Neblett, 57 Tex. 374, 374 (1882). This case concluded: "[A] judgment
lien creates such vested right as will be protected by section 10, article I ....
" Id
162. See, e.g., Wright v. Straub, 64 Tex. 64, 66-67 (1885) (judgment lien could not be
divested by change in exemption provision to include place of business); Paschal v.
Cushman, 26 Tex. 74, 75-76 (1861) (judgment lien could not be divested by increase of
exemption to $2000); First Realty Bank & Trust v. Youngkin, 568 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ) (new law giving homestead to single adult could not
defeat creditor's judgment lien).
163. See.In re Dawkins, 11 Bankr. 213, 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (abstracted judgment enforceable against subsequently claimed homestead); Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Ditto,
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the homestead prior to the 1983 amendment could argue under Gunn v.
Barry and Texas case law that the judgment debtor should not be entitled
to the larger exemption so as to divest the creditor of his lien. " On the
other hand, a judgment claimant who had not abstracted his judgment
prior to the implementation of the current amendment would have difficulty arguing under Texas law that he has a vested right in what was the
debtor's non-exempt property under the previous constitutional provision. "6' 5 The Texas statute clearly states that a lien does not attach to the
debtor's realty until a judgment is recorded. 6 6 While a creditor may have
a vested right to a pre-established lien, he does not have a vested right in a
prior exemption law and may not rely on its continuation. 67
2.

Alternative Approach

Since the Texas Legislature has never before indicated an intention to
apply exemption amendments retroactively, there are no Texas cases directly on point as to whether a creditor may have an inviolable right to
what was previously excess homestead property for satisfaction of his
claim. There are two applicable Louisiana cases, however, that have dealt
with this issue.' 6 8 In both of these cases, 16 9 the courts based their opinions
566 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (failure of both
spouses to sign readjustment contract did not defeat puchase money lien).
164. See, e.g., Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610, 622-24 (1872) (exemption law
could not be increased to defeat contract rights of creditors); Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F.
Supp. 139, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (court disallowed homesteader to claim higher exemption),
atd, 532 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); In re Bobbit, 3 Bankr. 372,
373 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1976) (court applied lower exemption value to debtor's homestead).
165. See, e.g., Day v. Day, 610 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.) (had judgment lien been at issue, homestead designation by ex-husband before wife
had abstracted her judgment would have defeated her lien); Wisdom v. Wisdom, 575
S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ dism'd) (judgment in personam
rendered in divorce proceeding must be abstracted before lien may attach); Burton Lingo
Co. v. Warren, 45 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd) (judgment
does not create lien until abstracted).
166. See Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 576, § 52.001 (to be codified as TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon Supp. 1984-1985)).
167. See Lyon & Matthews Co. v. Modern Order of Praetorians, 142 S.W. 29, 30 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1911, no writ) (exemptions do not create vested rights).
168. See United States v. Smith, 486 F. Supp. 76, 77 (E.D. La. 1980) (suit brought on
behalf of Small Business Administration to foreclose on collateral mortgage executed by
Smith); Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Rowan, 345 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (bank
sought to enforce prior homestead limitation in collateral mortgage agreement executed
under prior law), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978).
169. See United States v. Smith, 486 F. Supp. 76, 78 (E.D. La. 1980) (obligation of
contract not violated by application of new exemption); Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Rowan, 345
So. 2d 1014, 1016-17 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (new exemption did not impair contract obligations), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978).
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upon what is considered the "new view" of the contract clause.' 70 This
view originated in the United States Supreme Court decision of Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,171 in which the Court held that
the prohibition against the impairment of contractual obligations "is not
an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula."'7 2 The Court found that the contract clause is not only
"qualified by the measure of control which the state retains over remedial
processes, but the state also continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people."' 7 3 Consequently, when Louisiana amended
its own urban homestead exemption in 1974, 174 the courts applied a liberal
interpretation of the contract clause to favor the homesteader. 7 5
In the first Louisiana case, Ouachita National Bank v. Rowan, 176 the
bank had entered into a mortgage agreement with a homestead claimant
who subsequently sought to exempt a larger portion of his property under
an amendment to the Louisiana constitution which increased the homestead to $15,000. 177 The court held that "[tlhe Bank had no vested interest
in the homestead of its debtor at least until it obtained its judgment and
recorded it in the mortgage records ... ,78 In response to the bank's
argument that such a decision was a retroactive application of the exemption in derogation of the Louisiana constitution, 79 the court held that the

170. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 499-501 (1964) (amendment of Texas

law providing for termination contract and forfeiture of land held not to impair obligation
of contracts); Hooter v. Wilson, 273 So. 2d. 516, 520 (La. 1973) (increased exemption in
Louisiana garnishment statute to be applied retroactively did not violate contract clause);
Macumber v. Shafer, 637 P.2d 645, 647 (Wash. 1981) (increase in homestead exemption

applied retroactively not unconstitutional impairment of contract obligation).
171. 290 U.S. 398 (1933). The Supreme Court held that emergency Minnesota legisla-

tion extending the time allowed for redeeming property from foreclosure was not an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. See id at 444.
172. Id at 428.
173. Id at 434.
174. See LA. CoNsT. art. XII, § 9 (providing for at least a $15,000 exemption limit on
value of homestead).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 486 F. Supp. 76, 78 (E.D. La. 1980) (increased

exemption implied in pre-existing contract); Credit Serv. Corp. v. Bagley, 364 So. 2d 624,
627 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (lien. established four months prior to petition in bankruptcy could
be cancelled by court); Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Rowan, 345 So. 2d 1014, 1018 (La. Ct. App.
1977) (homesteader entitled to increased exemption despite pre-existing contract), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); see also Macumber v. Shafer, 637 P.2d 645, 647 (Wash. 1981)
(retroactive homestead statute increasing exemption not violation of contract clause).
176. 345 So. 2d 1014 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978).
177. See id at 1015.

178. See id at 1017.
179. See LA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 26. This section provides: "[T]his Constitution shall
not be retroactive and shall not create any right or liability which did not exist under the
constitution of 1921 ...." Id.
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amendment was merely a modification of the previous exemption and as
such did not impair the contractual obligation at issue.' 8 The court, however, expressed in dicta that the result of the case might have been different
had the bank
recorded its judgment before the exemption was
8
increased.' '

In a subsequent case, UnitedStates v. Smith, 182 the debtors had executed
a collateral mortgage when the Louisiana homestead exemption was
$4,000. 183 The exemption was subsequently increased, and the debtors
claimed they were entitled to the higher exemption. 84 The court cited
Ouachita to support its finding that the debtors were entitled to the increased exemption value and held that "[a]lthough the homestead exemption as it existed was 'read into' the collateral mortgage on the Smith's
home, the right of the state to increase the amount of the exemption was
impliedly reserved."'8 5 In dicta, the court also addressed the Ouachita
court's reservations in applying this rule to creditors who had previously
abstracted their judgments when the exemption was increased. 86 An earlier Louisiana case, Daniel v. Thigpen 8' 7 had held that a debtor was not
entitled to an increased exemption when the amendment was subsequent
to the execution of the mortgage contract and the rendition of a judgment
in favor of the creditor. 88 The court in Smith, however, dismissed the
decision in Daniel as one decided "before the 'new' approach to the contract clause" and therefore inapplicable today. 8 9 The Smith case therefore suggests that no creditor has a vested right in non-exempt homestead
property which is subsequently rendered exempt by a constitutional
amendment.' 90 Thus, if Texas were to apply the principles in Smith, even
creditors who had abstracted their judgments before the 1983 amendment
would be susceptible to the higher exemption.
D. Retroactivity and Its Effects on Homesteaders
Another hypothetical problem arising from the retroactivity of the new
180. See Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Rowan, 345 So. 2d 1014, 1018 (La. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978).
181. See id at 1017.
182. 486 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. La. 1980).
183. See id.at 77.
184. See id at 77.
185. See id at 78.
186. See id.at 79 n.4.
187. 194 So. 6 (La. 1940). In Thigpin, the sheriff was ordered to sell Daniel's property
under execution of a judgment recovered by First National Bank of Arcadia. Daniel sought
to enjoin the sale of property he claimed as his homestead. See id at 6.
188. See id at 7.
189. See United States v. Smith, 486 F. Supp. 76, 79 (E.D. La. 1980).
190. Cf.id.at 79.
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amendment is as follows: If a homesteader has purchased an acre and a
half of urban land after 1970 for $10,000, his entire homestead has been
exempt from the claims of creditors. 9 ' The effect of the retroactive
amendment, however, would be to make unexempt and subject to creditors
one-half acre of the homesteader's property. 192 The issue, therefore, becomes whether the homesteader has a constitutional right to maintain a
totally exempt homestead. In other words, is he entitled to apply the prior
exemption to his property despite the retroactivity of the amendment? The
193
occurrence of this situation was clearly not intended by the Legislature,
and despite its improbable nature, its possibility raises interesting constitutional questions. The considerations are largely the same as those discussed with regard to the rights of creditors, namely, whether there is a
vested right in a particular exemption law. In an early case, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held that the legislature could retroactively reduce the
amount of the homestead exemption without violating any constitutional
rights of a debtor. 194 In another case, an Illinois appellate court held that
the plaintiff did not have a right to a homestead exemption in property he
co-owned prior to enactment of a statute prohibiting a homestead exemption between co-tenants. 9 5 Both of these holdings would support the view
that a homesteader does not have a vested right in a prior exemption
law.' 9 6 Although Texas does not have any'case law similar to the Tennessee or Illinois decisions, a similar
conclusion can be drawn from Texas
197
cases concerning other issues.
In his early treatise on homesteads, Thompson addressed the question of
191. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51 (1876, amended 1970).
192. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.

193. See Debate on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105 on the Floor of the House (second reading
and adoption), 68th Leg. (April 14, 1983) (tape available at St. Mary's Law Journal Office).
The purpose of the retroactivity was to increase the protection to all urban homeowners. See
id
194. See Walkup v. Covington, 114 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1938). The court distinguished this case from one in which the legislature attempted to increase a debtor's exemption subsequent to the creation of the debt, the latter case being an unconstitutional
impairment of contractual obligations. See id. at 47.
195. See Petrulionis v. Dudek, 252 N.E.2d 23, 24-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (suit brought
by co-tenant against other owners to have homestead estate set apart to himself).
196. See Petrulionis v. Dudek, 252 N.E.2d 23, 25 (I11.App. Ct. 1969) (homesteader did
not have right to prior exemption); Walkup v. Covington, 114 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1938)
(homestead exemption not vested right); see also Taylor v. Madigan, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376, 391
(1975) (homestead exemption not a vested right); Wyoming County Bank & Trust Co. v.
Kiley, 430 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902 (App. Div. 1980) (exemption law does not create vested right).
197. Cf Commerce Farm Credit Co. v. Sales, 288 S.W. 802, 804-05 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1926, holding approved) (rural homestead became urban whereupon homesteader lost
rural exemption); Lewis v. Brown, 321 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (extension of city changed rural homestead); Ayres v. Patton, 11I S.W. 1079,
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a debtor's constitutional right to a prior exemption by using the example of
98
a rural homesteader who suddenly finds himself within the city limits.
This occurrence raises the issue of whether the homesteader can maintain
his rural exemption although the city has been extended to meet his rural
land, or whether he must now apply the urban limitation to his property.
The law in Texas is clear on this point that the mere fact that a city's
corporate boundaries are extended to embrace a rural homestead does not
by itself destroy the homestead's rural character. 99 But, if the city begins
to build up around what was originally rural land, regardless of whether
the corporate lines are actually extended, the homestead character must
change with its surrounding conditions. 2" Consequently, a homestead
that was completely exempt under its rural character can lose part of its
exemption when it forcibly becomes urban land.2"' In the case of
Lauchheimer & Sons v. Saunders, 20 2 the Texas Supreme Court held: "The
Constitution exempts homesteads, whether urban or rural, when it is established, but it does not guarantee that the character impressed upon the
property at one time shall continue for the future., 20 3 This principle, applied to the problem of a totally exempt homestead, which becomes only
partially exempt with the enactment of the area limitation, seems to indi-

1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (extension of city prevented homesteader from claiming

rural exemption).
198. See S. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS §§ 13-14
(1878). Many of the early cases cited by Thompson held that debtors did not have a vested
right in previous exemptions. See id § 13.
199. See Posey v. Bass, 77 Tex. 512, 514, 14 S.W. 156, 157 (1890) (extension of town
limits to include rural land did not of itself change land to urban homestead); Nolan v.
Reed, 38 Tex. 425, 428 (1873) (rural homestead did not lose its character by extension of
town boundary); Bassett v. Messner, 30 Tex. 604, 613 (1868) (subsequent incorporation of
town did not turn rural homestead into town homestead); Taylor v. Boulware, 17 Tex. 74, 80
(1856) (extension of town limits did not immediately make homestead a town homestead).
200. See, e.g., Commerce Farm Credit Co. v. Sales, 288 S.W. 802, 804 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1926, holding approved) (growth of city could change homestead into urban dwelling);
Jones v. First Nat'l Bank, 259 S.W. 157, 159 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgmt adopted) (city
may grow beyond corporate limits to embrace and change rural homestead); Ayres v. Patton, 111 S.W. 1079, 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (growth of town changed rural
homestead to urban); see also Urech, The Changing Homestead- When the City Meets the
Farm, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 145, 145 (1976) (rural homestead may become urban by growth of
city).
201. See Lanchheimer & Sons v. Saunders, 97 Tex. 137, 142, 76 S.W. 750, 752 (1903)
(former rural homestead subject to creditors' claims); Waggoner v. Haskell, 35 S.W. 711, 712
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ) (owner whose rural homestead is brought into city limits and
subdivided only entitled to urban exemption).
202. 97 Tex. 137, 76 S.W. 750 (1903) (action to enjoin execution sale of 100 acres formerly rural homestead).
203. See id. at 140, 76 S.W. at 751.
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cate that the homesteader does not have a vested right to the prior
exemption.
V.

CONCLUSION

Exemption of the homestead from forced sale can aid society in attaining worthwhile objectives such as protection against creditors of the family's or single adult's home as well as rehabilitation of the debtor.
Exemptions can, however, have overreaching effects if they are not also
attuned to the needs and circumstances of debtors, creditors, and society.
Texas has responded to a change in economic and social conditions by
increasing its urban homestead exemption from $10,000 in value to one
acre of land and by applying these changes retroactively. It is questionable, however, whether the amendment to the urban homestead exemption
achieves the proper balance. The effects of the new exemption have yet to
manifest themselves within the state, but one can estimate that such an
exemption will lead to unfair and unanticipated consequences for some
creditors and homesteaders in Texas.
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